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A MORAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MIRACLES
James A. Keller

Those who believe that miracles (temporary suspensions of some law of nature
accomplished by divine power) have occurred typically hold that they are rare and
that only a small percentage of all people have been eyewitnesses to ihem or been
direct beneficiaries of them. Although a claim that they occur far more frequently
would be empirically highly implausible, I argue that the claim that God performs
miracles in such a pattern unavoidably implies that God is gUilty of unfairness. I
articulate a criterion of fairness, discuss various types of miracles, and defend my
conclusion against a variety of possible rejoinders.
In the literature of the philosophy of religion in the Judeo-Christian tradition,
miracles have generally been understood to be temporary suspensions of one
or more laws of nature accomplished by divine power. That is, in a miracle,
God causes the occurrence of some process which, apart from the exercise
of divine power, would have been impossible in that situation- impossible
because that occurrence is not within the natural capacities of the creaturely
entities involved. It is important to note that there is no term in the Old
Testament or in the New which is equivalent to miracle in this sense.! Thus,
our concern in this paper is with a concept which originated after biblical
times, though one whose development was probably stimulated by reflection
on certain biblical narratives. Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, the term
miracle will refer to the post-biblical concept indicated in the first sentence. 2
The question of whether or not miracles in this sense occur or are even
possible has generated a vast literature, as has the question of whether one
could ever be justified in believing that a miracle had occurred. However,
my concern in this paper is not with any of these issues (though I shall at one
point touch lightly on one of them). Instead, I want to focus on what I shall
call a moral argument against miracles. It attempts to show that today's
believers in the actual occurrence of miracles typically must imply that God
is guilty of a kind of unfairness-a quality which seems morally problematic
and thus one which, I assume, believers would not want to attribute to God. 3
My argument does not claim that all miracles, no matter when or in what
pattern they occur, must involve unfairness on God's part; rather, it is an
argument against a certain complex view of their purpose, location, and
obviousness, a view which is rather common today among those who hold
that miracles have occurred. However, because it is difficult to formulate
another empirically plausible view of the purpose, location, and obviousness
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of miracles, problems with the view I discuss pose a challenge for anyone
who believes that miracles have actually occurred. Thus, it is an argument
for the conclusion that even theists should not claim that God has actually
worked miracles, lest they imply that God is unfair or be driven to claims
about the occurrence of miracles which are empirically false or at least implausible.
The claim that the view of miracles to be discussed implies that God is
unfair might suggest that my moral argument against miracles is simply
another aspect of the problem of evil. In a way that suggestion is correct.
But I believe that the claim that God has performed miracles raises problems
with which some of today's most popular theodicies seem inadequate to deal.
For example, many theodicies today treat natural evils as unavoidable results
of the operation of a system of laws of nature. Humans suffer natural evils
because of the joint operation of these laws and the choices humans make;
e.g., a tornado touches down (because of the operation of certain laws of
nature) on the spot where a person has chosen (for reasons that have nothing
to do with that tornado) to locate his home, and the person is killed. People
who advance such theodicies usually are not theological determinists, and
they would not say that God intended to cause the death of that person while
sparing his neighbor who lives a block away.4 But those who claim that God
has miraculously saved someone's life must claim that God intended to save
precisely that person's life and by not miraculously intervening did not intend
to save the life of the person who died. Thus, the claim that God has worked
a miracle implies that God has singled out certain persons for some benefit
which many others do not receive; this is central to my claim that it implies
that God is unfair. s The balance of my paper consists of an articulation and
defense of this claim.
No event would be categorized as a miracle unless it is unexpected and
thought to have some good purpose; it would not be categorized as a violation
of some law of nature unless it were unexpected, and it would not be attributed to divine agency unless its purpose were believed to be good. 6 Among
events which might be categorized as miracles, I find it helpful to distinguish
two types, which I shall term obvious miracles and inferred miracles. When
someone who categorizes an event as a miracle (thinks she) knows enough
about the processes involved in the event and the relevant accepted laws of
nature to determine that the former could not happen unless the latter were
suspended, it is an obvious miracle. For example, if a person understands
the account in Judges of the sun's standing still in response to Joshua's
command to involve the Earth's instantaneously ceasing to rotate on its axis
and that person also accepts the principle of inertia, she could determine that
the former could not happen unless the latter were suspended. But if the
categorizer does not have detailed enough information about the processes
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involved in the event or the relevant laws of nature to determine that the
event must have involved a suspension of some law of nature, it is an inferred
miracle. In inferred miracles the categorizer infers that the event involved a
suspension of some law of nature because the outcome is both unusual in
comparison to the outcome of many apparently similar situations and better
than the usual outcome (e.g., a person's recovering from an illness from
whom few recover or walking away with virtually no injuries from a crash
at 60 miles per hour). In other words the difference is this: in an obvious
miracle there is a logical inconsistency between statements describing the
event and statements describing some accepted laws of nature; however, in
an inferred miracle one lacks a sufficiently detailed set of statements about
the event or about relevant accepted laws of nature to yield a logical inconsistency, but one infers that there would be an inconsistency if both types of
statements were sufficiently detailed. 7
It is important to realize that justifying the claim that the latter are miracles
involves a problem not faced by analogous claims about the former. In
obvious miracles, there is a direct inconsistency between the belief that some
process occurred in the world and the acceptance of some law of nature, but
in inferred miracles that there is an inconsistency between some process and
some law of nature is inferred on the basis of the unlikeliness of the outcome. S
Thus, someone who believes that an inferred miracle has occurred is usually
relying on what might be termed "statistical evidence." The event deemed a
miracle might be the "miraculous" recovery of someone diagnosed as having
incurable terminal cancer; sometimes in such cases believers had prayed for
the life of the individual. Or the event might be the emergence unhurt of a
person involved in a terrible accident of a sort which is usually instantly fatal.
In neither case does any human know both the relevant laws of nature and
the initial conditions well enough to say that such an event violated any laws
of nature. But both events are sufficiently unusual and unexpected (statistically unlikely) and sufficiently ic line with what believers think a loving and
merciful God might do that some believers may call them miracles. And
some who call them that might mean the term not just in the sense of a
wonderful and surprising event, but in the strong sense of the temporary
suspension of a law of nature accomplished by the power of God.
Just as part of the reason for thinking that an event is an inferred miracle
typically depends on comparing it with similar events, so does the reason for
my charge that attributing this sort of miracle to God implies that God is
unfair. The basis for my objection to this sort of miracle is the total absence
of any pattern in the alleged miracles. For example, of all the people with
what doctors believe to be terminal cancer, some "miraculously" (i.e., unexpectedly) recover; most do not. Those who recover are not confined to believers, nor even to believers and those who will eventually become believers.
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Nor are those who recover confined to people for whom prayers were offered;
nor does everyone for whom prayers were offered recover. Nor is there any
other discernible pattern among those who recover, and certainly not any
discernible pattern related to what believers hold to be important to God.
Moreover, the problem is not merely the lack of any discernible overall
pattern. More specifically, there may be two cases which are similar in all
ways that seem relevant, yet in one case there will be a recovery (which some
deem a miracle) and in the other case no recovery. The same is true for other
allegedly miraculous events (of the inferred type): they fit no discernible
pattern, and apparently similar cases have different outcomes. Several believers pray for highly unlikely outcomes; some receive what they prayed for
in ways that seem sufficiently strange and unexpected that some people will
claim that the outcome involved a miracle, but others do not receive what
they prayed for.
My objection is based on this lack of any discernible pattern and the fact
of different outcomes in similar cases, both of which suggest the unfairness
of what God is alleged to have done. We should note that these two factors
also suggest another possibility: that what are taken to be miracles are not,
that instead they are the result of the operation of creaturely factors as yet
not known or understood. Here the believer in miracles faces a dilemma. Ex
hypothesi, he is speaking of events which are not clearly impossible in light
of accepted laws of nature; rather, his reasons for regarding them as miracles
are their unusualness and their conformity to what he takes to be divine
purposes. But believers typically do not categorize all such events as miracles. Why not? Not doing so seems arbitrary and unjustified on their part.
Note that my point is not the claim that God would be arbitrary to perform
miracles in this fashion but that the believer is being arbitrary in identifying
only a proper subset of events of this type as miracles. Note too that my
point is not that raised with such force by Hume: the qualities used to identify
the alleged miracle are not sufficient to justify the conclusion that the event
truly involved a suspension of a law of nature (rather than an error on the
observer's part or a mistaken belief about what the laws of nature are).
Instead it is that even if these qualities are adequate to identify miracles, it
is arbitrary to call only some events possessing these qualities miracles.
However, the only way for a person to avoid this arbitrariness about which
events are miracles and which are not is to say that all events with these
features are miracles-e.g., all events in which a patient recovers after doctors had said that the situation is hopeless. Few believers in miracles have
made a claim like this, but it is arbitrary to claim a miracle in relation to any
proper subset of such events.
This difficulty would not arise in connection with events which are what I
termed obvious miracles. Presumably any event which was believed to in-
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volve a clear-cut inconsistency with some accepted law of nature and have
an outcome of the sort believed to be consistent with God's purposes would
be called a miracle by those believe that miracles occur. But believers are
not inclined to label as miracles all events which meet the criteria on the basis
of which they label some events miracles of what I termed the inferred type.
Thus they seem to be guilty of arbitrariness in their own judgments.

Miracles as Involving Unfairness by God
Moreover, even if they eliminate this arbitrariness by identifying as miracles all the events which meet their precise criteria (whatever those be), the
resulting view would still imply that God is guilty of unfairness. So too
would a view which identifies as miracles all events which involve an apparent inconsistency between what is believed to have occurred and accepted
laws of nature. In what sense do these views imply that God is unfair? They
do so in the sense that they imply that God takes the initiative in doing for
one person something qualitatively different from what God does for others
in a similar condition. The phrase takes the initiative is intended to exclude
God's acting in response to a person's doing something to which God had a
policy of acting in a certain way. For example, suppose that God had promised
to perform a requested miracle for anyone who included in the request the
words "God, please do this miracle for me" (or their equivalent in other
languages). Then if God performed the requested miracle in response to some
person's properly phrased request, God would not be "taking the initiative.,,9
But if God chose someone for no reason at all and performed a miracle for
that person, God would be taking the initiative. I assume that performing a
miracle is qualitatively different from God's doing something which does not
involve the temporary suspension of some law of nature. In light of the
explanation of takes the initiative, the phrase about others in a similar condition may be redundant, but it serves as a reminder that the charge of
unfairness is not leveled simply when it is alleged that God does something
for one person that God does not do for another; the two people must be
similar in respect to the quality which is the reason for the divine action. If
there is no such quality, then it is unfair because God is arbitrarily (ex hypothesi, there is no reason) bestowing a benefit on one person which God
does not bestow on another.
To this account of unfairness, at least two rejoinders might be offered. It
might be claimed that God has reasons for selecting some people and not
others; we shall explore that possibility later in the paper. The other rejoinder
is that even if God does confer benefits on some people and not on others,
this would not be unfair because God is not under any obligation to give
humans something.] 0 I think the alleged reason is questionable. Although
God was under no obligation to create us, God's own nature might preclude
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God's treating us in certain ways once we had been created; for example, it
would seem to deeply violate any concept of divine goodness if God were to
create us or any sentient creatures with the intention that they should experience nothing but great suffering for their entire existence. But even if this
consideration is not decisive, the Christian has an even stronger reason to
resist implying that God treats people in such a way as to confer benefits on
some and not on similar others. Christians assert that God loves humans; and
if two similar people are in similar situations, it is not loving to treat them
differently. So if it seems inappropriate to some Christians to apply concepts
like fair and unfair to God, they may instead think of what is loving and
unloving.
But this claim that it is not loving to treat similar people differently may
be challenged: I may love both my children equally, yet give them different
but equal goods. Yes, but this would be treating them similarly, for the goods
are equal. I am assuming that the goods which believers have seen as conferred in a miracle on one person are typically not matched by an equal good
conferred on another who is not the recipient of a miraculous benefit. (This
assumption will be defended later when we consider the kinds of goods
thought to be conferred in miracles.) If the two people are in other ways
similar, then giving one and not the other a miraculous benefit is not treating
them similarly. Another challenge might be that I would not be unfair to give
a gift to one person I love and not to another whom I love equally. Perhaps
not, provided what is given is a gift and not something needed. (But even in
this case, how will one child feel if a parent gives a gift to a sibling and not
to the first child even though there is no reason in the situation for the
distinction-i.e., it was not either's birthday, neither had suffered any hurt,
etc.?) However, when what is given is needed (e.g., restoration to health or
even the knowledge of God) and when it lies within the resources of the giver
to give what is needed to both people he loves, then it does seem to me unfair
· ) to give
. .It to on I y one. 11
( or un I ovmg
According to the argument thus far, it is unfair for God to perform miracles
for some people and not for others, because in so doing God takes the initiative in conferring benefits upon some people involved in the mi.racle which
others do not obtain. We have two remaining possible responses to this argument to be considered: (1) God has reasons for performing miracles for some
people and not others, reasons adequate to undermine the charge of unfairness, and (2) there are no benefits given to some which are not given to others.
To deal with these objections, we need to consider with greater specificity
the goods which God allegedly confers in miracles.
In the Christian tradition two kinds of goods have been mentioned. One
has to do with enhancing the recipient's knowledge of God or faith in God;
the other has to with various temporal goods, such as life, health, and other

60

Faith and Philosophy

goods which are needed or desired (financial help, offspring, etc.). I shall
term a miracle which provides the first sort of good an epistemic miracle,
and one which provides the second sort of good a practical miracle. Of
course, a miracle could provide both sorts of goods; for example, a healing
miracle performed by Jesus would be a practical miracle and could also
highlight Jesus' role as a revealer of God and thus be an epistemic miracle.
Most Christian theologians and philosophers have stressed the epistemic
function of miracles. They have held that miracles are intended to certify, to
confirm, or in some way to reinforce or call attention to some divine revelation in order to increase the likelihood that the events (or the message 12 ) be
accepted as revelationY Though this view of the purpose of miracles is
common in the post-biblical Christian tradition, it is not at all clear that most
of the events in the Bible which the later tradition took to be miracles have
exactly this purpose. Some clearly do-e.g., some demonstrations by Moses
in his conflict with the Egyptian magicians (Ex. 7:8-13); Gideon's use of a
fleece (Judges 6:36-40); Elijah's contest with the prophets of Baal (I Kings
18:20-40); Jesus' healing of the paralytic (Mk: 2: 10-12); and the claim that
Jesus was attested by God "with mighty works and wonders and signs" (Acts
2:22). Most of the other events later seen as miracles do not seem intended
to confirm the revelatory status of some different event or some person or
some message. Instead, they are themselves revelatory of God (perhaps more
specifically of God's power, concern, intentions, etc.). But if they are themselves revelatory rather than confirming something else as revelation, I would
still classify them as having an epistemic purpose.
Theologians and philosophers have been most concerned with the epistemic
benefits of miracles, but popular piety has been at least as concerned with
practical miracles. Believers tell stories of healings (those at Lourdes are
famous examples) and of other sorts of non-epistemic benefits conferred
through miracles.
Could there be other purposes of miracles? I know of no way to rule out
the possibility of there being other purposes, but there are problems with
articulating this possibility. The purposes I suggested are those which have
been advanced by believers in the occurrence of miracles who have reflected
on them over the centuries. Alternative suggestions would have a burden of
proof to show their congruity with some religious tradition. Moreover, the
two purposes I have discussed encompass the primary purposes which believers think God has in actions toward humans: to bring them to a knowledge of and faith in God (the epistemic purpose) and to graciously restore
them to wholeness.
Nor would it be a useful strategy for a believer in miracles to suggest that
their purpose is unknown (or unknowable) by humans or that they have no
purpose. For this would make miracles impossible in principle to identify.
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For a miracle is not just an event which seems impossible given known laws
of nature; it is an event of this sort brought about by divine power. But how
can we recognize that the power is divine without identifying the purpose of
the event and linking it to what we believe to be the sort of purposes God
has? For we can identify a nonbodied agent like God only by the purposes
we see manifested in God's activity. So we cannot be ignorant of the purpose
of an event and rationally attribute it to divine agency.14 Therefore, those
who believe that miracles have occurred would seem well advised to claim
that they were performed for an epistemic or practical purpose or both.

Epistemic Miracles
According to the view of miracles being discussed, epistemic miracles are
concentrated in, or perhaps even confined exclusively to, periods of time
which might be called revelatory periods. In Christianity such periods were,
e.g., the times of the Exodus, of the Old Testament prophets, and of Jesus
and the beginnings of the church. In times other than these, epistemic miracles are believed to occur either not at all or rarely. IS
Before examining this view in detail, it is important to recognize that there
are strong reasons for a believer in the actual occurrence of miracles with
this primary purpose to hold a view like this of their temporal location. For
many Christians and most non-Christians would say that they had never
observed any miracles. Of course, those who do not believe that there exists
a God who can work miracles would certainly say they had never observed
any; but such people typically do not even admit that they have observed any
events which seem impossible to explain in light of accepted laws of nature
(which we might call candidate events).16 Therefore, today either miracles
do not occur at all, or they occur in such a way that many people do not
believe that they or even candidate events occur. But there would be no point
to a miracle with an epistemic purpose which was not such as to be thought
a miracle (or at least a candidate event) by virtually all observers. 17 Thus,
claiming that miracles with this purpose are confined to (or at least concentrated in) revelatory periods not including the present is an understandable
strategy to explain the paucity of such miracles today.
Moreover, we must exercise care in evaluating the claims of those who say
that they have observed such miracles. We must first be sure that they are
using miracle in the sense of this paper. For as we noted earlier, sometimes
people will apply the term miracle to an event simply because it is unexpected
and constitutes or accomplishes some important good, without any serious
consideration of whether the event involves the suspension of accepted laws
of nature (as opposed, say, to involving processes for which we have not
established specific enough laws of nature to determine whether the processes
require suspensions of any of them). Many such events would not be obvious
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miracles and might not be miracles at all in the sense that term has in this
paper.
However, if after this clarification there remain some who would claim that
obvious miracles with an epistemic purpose occur today, that would not
constitute a serious problem for my argument. For my objection to the claim
that epistemic miracles occur is that God's performing epistemic miracles for
some people and not for others would involve unfairness on God's part. So
even if God does perform obvious epistemic miracles for some people today,
the large number of people for whom no obvious miracles (or candidate
events) are performed would still constitute an adequate ground for my ob.
.
18
Jectlon.
The problem with this understanding of the purpose and location of
epistemic miracles is that it implies that the eyewitnesses of the miracles had
a decided advantage which many other people did not have. For they would
have experienced an event designed to enhance the development of faith in
them but others would not have. If it would have been unreasonable to expect
them to believe that certain events were revelatory without the confirmation
provided by an obvious miracle, it is unreasonable to expect other people to
believe that the events were revelatory unless they see miracles confirming
the revelatory status of those events or have grounds as strong as the eyewitnesses had to believe that the miraculous events occurred as described. A
similar conclusion follows if the miraculous events are held to be revelatory
rather than to be confirmation of the revelatory status of something else: if
it would not be reasonable to expect eyewitnesses to believe that certain
events were revelations of God unless they involved an obvious miracle, then
it would not be reasonable to expect non-eyewitnesses to believe that they
were revelations of God unless they had grounds as strong as the eyewitnesses
to believe that the miraculous events occurred as described. In order for
others to have equally strong grounds, either they would have to see events
which are as clearly miraculous and which confirm a message endorsing the
earlier events,19 or they would have to have extremely well documented
eyewitness accounts of the events which the eyewitnesses saw. 20 For God
to fail to provide other people with such grounds is for God to treat those
people unfairly: God gave the eyewitnesses an epistemic advantage denied
to other (potential) believers.
To the claim that performing epistemic miracles for some people and not
for others is unfair, it might be objected that not every giving of an epistemic
advantage entails unfairness. I may teB a secret to one person and not to
another wi thout being unfair to the other. True, but not if (1) the secret
concerns a matter about which the people have an equal, very great need for
the information and (2) there are no grounds for me to treat the first differently from the second, particularly if I claim to love them both. And Chris-
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tians typically hold that what was revealed in (or confirmed by) epistemic
miracles is very important for a person's knowledge of God and faith relation
to God, which are matters of the greatest import for everyone. But, an
objector might continue, even if both people do desperately need the information, telling something to one person and not to another need not entail
unfairness if I know that the second person will soon come to believe or at
least hear what I told the first without my telling her. True again, but we are
speaking of matters which many people never even hear about. Moreover,
the objector's suggestion overlooks something crucial: the difference under
discussion is not just between those who are told something and those who
are not; it is between those who are told something accompanied by a miracle
and those who, if they hear it at all, do not receive an accompanying miracle
or equivalently clear divine confirmation. Perhaps an important reason why
many hear without believing is that they do not have the clear confirmation
given by epistemic miracles; in any event, if the religious message to some
people is accompanied by obvious miracles and to others it is not, the latter
have been placed at a disadvantage. Thus, none of the objections considered
in this paragraph provides a way to save God from the charge of unfairness
in giving certain people an epistemic advantage.
My response in the previous paragraph assumes that what is cDnfirmed in
an epistemic miracle is information which everyone needs equally-e.g.,
information on such matters as what one must do to be saved or to be rightly
related to God. This is what traditionally has been said to be confirmed. 21
But an objector might try to undercut the charge of unfairness against God
by claiming that not everyone needs equally the information conveyed in
epistemic miracles. For example, one might claim that people experience
epistemic miracles because God wishes them to do special tasks. The information might be that God wishes them to do the task. Here a classic example
would be the fleece of Gideon; the account in Judges 6:36-40 might well be
interpreted as indicating that God performed two miracles to confirm for
Gideon that God wanted him to lead the army of Israel against "its enemies.
Or it may be generally available information which is specially confirmed
because God wishes the person to do some extraordinarily difficult task;
perhaps the first disciples were permitted to see the risen Jesus because they
were to be the first leaders of the church.
This response does offer promise of undercutting the charge of unfairness
by providing a reason why God works epistemic miracles for the direct
benefit of only some people. But it faces at least two serious difficulties:
(1) the information confirmed by what are traditionally thought to be central
epistemic miracles (e.g., those done by Jesus to confirm his status) has traditionally not been held to be generally available nor discoverable without
special revelation and (2) many of what seem to be epistemic miracles do not
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seem to fit this pattern. For example, Elijah's victory over the priests of Baal
(I Kings 18:20-40)-one of the most dramatic epistemic miracles in the
Bible-was done for the benefit of ordinary Israelites, of whom there is no
reason to think that a special task was required. Some of the miracles done
by Jesus, which have traditionally been seen as having revelatory (epistemic)
purposes, were done to and in the presence of people of whom no special
task was required. 22 The presence of these two difficulties shows that this
response will require significant work if it is to have any hope of providing
a defense of the fairness of God in relation to what have been traditionally
regarded as epistemic miracles.
Another sort of difficulty for this proposal is created by the fact that many
believers who faced tasks of great difficulty were not granted any confirmation through epistemic miracles-or at least they never claimed to have witnessed any. This difficulty does not provide a counterexample to the thesis,
for the thesis at most claims that all epistemic miracles were done for those
who had some extraordinary task, not the converse. But it does raise the
issue of fairness in another way: is it fair that God grant a confirmatory
miracle to some on whom an extraordinarily difficult task is laid and not to
others? Nor can it be said that God knew that a confirmatory miracle would
not be needed in all those cases in which none was given, for not all believers
faced with tasks of great difficulty actually undertake them.
Sometimes it is said that though later (potential) believers lack the advantage of experiencing epistemic miracles, they have a different, compensating
advantage: they have seen the spread of the Church. The spread of the
Church is alleged to be confirmation of the truth of its proclamation. But it
would provide no confirmation for potential believers at times and places
when the Church is not known to have spread-e.g., during the second century and in those mission fields where the potential believers are not acquainted with facts about the growth of the Church. Thus, in relation to these
potential believers even if not in relation to us, the growth of the Church
would not provide an alternative to miracles as grounds to consider the
Christian proclamation true. Moreover, there are other religious groups
which have also spread widely and which have considerably different views
from those of Christians. Thus this alleged advantage affords the potential
believer no grounds for becoming a Christian rather than an adherent of one
of these other religions.
Moreover, sociologists and psychologists can provide a wide variety of
other reasons for the growth of various religious groups including the Christian community. These reasons involve such things as the power of deeply
held beliefs to influence one's own behavior and the beliefs of others, tribal
and national loyalties, financial considerations, the example of esteemed
others, etc. I do not know of any way to show that such reasons do not (nor
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that they do) completely explain the growth of the Christian community. But
such reasons do provide grounds to doubt the claim that the growth of the
Church provides rational confirmation of the truth of its proclamation, and
they probably make it not irrational to believe that the growth of the Church
can be explained without assuming the truth of its doctrines. Thus, I conclude
that if the purpose of miracles is to provide rational grounds for believing
that revelation occurred, then God treated the eyewitnesses to these miracles
in a specially favored way which is not duplicated or equalled for later
potential believers.
But perhaps it is wrong to construe the purpose of miracles as being the
provision of rational grounds to believe that a revelation occurred; it might
be claimed that the intended force of miracles is emotional or psychological
rather than rational. 23 That is, perhaps miracles occurred not- in order to
rationally certify the revelation, but in order to provide a powerful, though
ultimately non-rational, inducement to accept something as revelation. This
alternative, however, fares no better than the previous one. If God could not
expect many (any?) eyewitnesses of a prophet or Jesus to accept the revelation without the motivation provided by a miracle, then why should God
expect anyone today to do so without similar motivation? Again, the suggestion that the success of the Christian community provides an alternative
motivation fails for the same reasons as it failed earlier in relation to the
thesis that miracles were intended to provide rational confirmation for the
revelation.
We should not be surprised that the problems with saying that miracles are
intended to provide rational grounds for accepting a revelation also occur
when it is said that miracles are intended to provide a psychologiCal, but
non-rational, inducement to accept the revelation. For those problems had
to do not with the adequacy of miracles as rational grounds (or as emotional
inducement), but with what I claimed was the unfairness of God's providing
some people and not other people with these grounds. Thus, the problems
would hold no matter how miracles are said to promote acceptance of the
revelation.
It might, however, seem that there is a way miracles could playa role in
bringing people to accept the revelation without being liable to this criticism.
Suppose that miracles during revelatory periods are intended to motivate not
the acceptance of the revelation but only its serious consideration. Once
again, it might seem legitimate to raise the same objection: why should God
expect us today to seriously consider something when God would not expect
contemporaries of the event to seriously consider it without a miracle? But
if miracles are intended to motivate only the serious consideration of the
revelation, then the growth of the Church might provide something of an
alternative. As long as there are not too many successful religious commu-
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nities, that a particular community is known to have been successful might
provide some reason for seriously considering what it proclaims, along with
what is proclaimed by other communities known to have been successful. But
this alternative would still face the problem of there being some potential
believers for whom this could not be expected to provide a motivation-viz.,
those who do not know about the success of the Church; and even for those
who know of the Church's growth, the motivating power of that knowledge
could still be legitimately weakened by knowledge of sociological and psychological factors which contributed to the growth of the Church; Moreover,
if the growth of the Church is to replace miracles as something which motivates a person to seriously consider Christian claims about revelation (or if
that growth is itself a miracle which is intended to do this), then the splintering of the Christian community into different groups with different views
about the alleged revelation will confuse the person about exactly what is to
be seriously considered.
There are other problems with any view which makes the purpose of
epistemic miracles to be the provision of anything less than rational grounds
for accepting the revelation. If their purpose is to provide emotional inducement to accept the revelation, then God is tricking or conning people into
belief. Of course, the belief is (on this view) true, but people are nevertheless
being brought to believe in a way which we would ordinarily condemn or at
least question. While some thinkers (e.g., William James) might contend that
the use of emotional inducements is legitimate on matters on which adequate
rational evidence cannot be obtained, ex hypothesi this is not true in the
present case. For the view under discussion assumes that obvious miracles
have occurred. And if they have occurred, there is no reason why they could
not provide rational grounds and not merely emotional inducement. The
variation that takes the purpose of miracles to be to motivate the serious
consideration of the revelation faces the additional problem that once one has
given the revelation serious consideration, one still must decide on some other
grounds whether or not to accept it. Since ex hypothesi the miracle is not
these other grounds, they must be available even without the miracle.
Indeed, if miracles do not provide rational grounds for accepting a revelation, then if there are any rational grounds, they must be something other
than the miracles. Presumably the grounds would be something like the
inherent plausibility of what is proclaimed or its plausibility in light of certain
other factors. 24 But whatever they are, they are available without the miracles.
Thus, I conclude that if miracles are intended to play any role in rationally
grounding faith or in inducing one either to have faith or to give Christianity
serious consideration, then potential believers who observed the miracles are
in a favored position in relation to other potential believers. Therefore, I hold
that God has treated some people unfairly unless for all people (1) God causes
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events whose status as miracles is equally clear or (2) God gives grounds
for believing that the miracles occurred which are as strong as those possessed
by the original eyewitnesses. I take it that there is universal agreement that
condition (l) is not met; and I also take it that later belicvers do not havc
grounds to believe that miracles have occurred which are as strong as those
of the eyewitnesses. While there is disagreement about how strong the evidence provided by the Bible is, no one would contend that it is as strong as
that which the eyewitnesses had.
Perhaps it will be objected that no evidence about the occurrence of an
event could be as strong as that provided by eyewitness observation, so God
could not possibly provide later potential believers with evidence as strong
as that provided to eyewitnesses. But this will not save God from the charge
of unfairness, for if it is so, then God could have continued to perform
miracles. If God did not do so, at least CJod could have made the documentary
evidence regarding the occurrence of the event strong enough that obvious
historiographical objections would be precluded. For example, God could
have caused there to be eyewitness accounts written immediately after the
alleged events, perhaps even accounts by hostile witnesses, such as Pharaoh
for the events in Moses' time and the Jewish leaders for events in Jesus' time.
If God caused miracles for the sake of potential believers at the time of the
revelations, then God could and should have done more for later potential
believers. If God did not do more, then God does seem guilty of unfairness.
This concludes my discussion of the theory that God performs epistemic
miracles for only certain people. I have argued that this theory puts the
eyewitnesses of the miracles in a greatly favored position. Note that I have
not argued that it is unfair for God to make certain events revelatory even
though only certain people can directly experience those events.' Rather, my
argument is that (1) accompanying these events with obvious, often dramatic
miracles (or having such miracles as constituents of revelatory events) for
the purpose of rationally certifying them or inducing faith or inducing consideration of them puts the eyewitnesses in a specially favored position, (2)
putting people in such a position is unfair unless God performs equally clear
miracles for later potential believers or gives them something of equal evidential or motivational value, and (3) God has done neither.
Before ending this section, however, perhaps I should expand on my claim
that I have not argued that it is unfair for God to make certain events revelatory even though only certain people can experience them. Though I have
not argued for this thesis, it might seem difficult for me to avoid holding it
as well as my thesis about miracles. But whether or not I can avoid it depends
on God's role in the revelatory events. So that they do not fall under the
strictures of my thesis about miracles, we shall have to assume that the
revelatory events neither are themselves miracles nor are confirmed by mir-
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acles. Then their occurrence is the result of natural processes, yet ex hypothesi they also manifest God. Why? If our theory is that God's being
manifested depends on an additional divine activity of some sort in relation
to this event which God does not exercise in relation to other qualitatively
similar events, then this understanding would seem to imply that God is
unfair. On the other hand, suppose our theory is that whenever events have
certain properties, God is manifest in them. This theory would not involve
God's being unfair, for it would not involve God's taking the initiative to
treat some people differently from others who are qualitatively similar.
But it might be objected that even this latter theory suggests a kind of
unfairness, for not everyone has heard about these revelatory events, so some
people are specially privileged. But the fact that some people have not heard
about these revelatory events would show that God is unfair only if the fact
that some people had heard and others had not heard depended on some divine
initiative in which God treats qualitatively similar people differently, and
there is no reason to think that there has been such an initiative. That some
people have access to these revelatory events and others do not is the result
of the normal operation of creaturely processes. Nevertheless, it might be
objected, some people have access to saving divine revelation and others do
not. This situation may not be the result of unfairness in the sense defined
in this paper, but it still does not seem right in some important sense. I
sympathize with the sentiment underlying this objection. But it seems not
right only if others do not have access to some saving divine revelation, not
necessarily the one recognized by Christians. Whether or not they do is
disputed, and we cannot pursue the issue here. But enough has been said to
distinguish my thesis about miracles from the issue raised by the claim that
revelation is given in historical events.

Practical Miracles
Practical miracles is my term for miracles which are intended to confer some
benefit not directly related to the knowledge of God or faith in God. The
benefit could be, e.g., healing, preserving lives, or meeting other human needs
and desires. Since these need not have any epistemic purpose, their being
miracles need not be obvious to anyone. However, as with epistemic miracles, the claim that God performs such miracles implies that God is unfair,
for God is taking the initiative in conferring benefits on some people which
God does not confer on other similar people in similar circumstances. Now
we need to deal with two possible lines of response to this problem with
claiming that God performs practical miracles.
The first response is that there is no unfairness because there are no benefits
given in miracles to one person which are not given to others. Taken at face
value this claim seems just plain false. As we noted earlier, for everyone on
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whom it is claimed that God bestowed benefits through a miracle, there are
apparently similar people in similar situations on whom no similar benefit is
bestowed, either in a miracle or in the ordinary course of events. Not everyone who is terminally ill unexpectedly recovers, not everyone who is hungry receives food (or the means to obtain food), etc.
So perhaps it will be claimed not that similar benefits are given, but that
appropriate benefits are given. One terminally ill person is miraculously
healed; another very similar person is not because God knows that she would
suffer even more or she would become wicked if she were healed. Thus God
is doing for each what is most beneficial for each. Because this response
makes claims about humanly unknowable hypotheticals, I do not think there
is any way to conclusively disprove it, but certain considerations make it
extremely implausible. We know of too many cases in which human lives
are shattered by some natural or moral evil to think it likely that the most
loving thing for God to do in most situations of this sort is to let the creaturely
world run its course in these cases without divine intervention. 25 For example, a baby suffers from some disease which leaves it a near vegetable or
suffers from some abuse which leaves it severely brain-damaged and physically crippled. Such tragedies may well leave the baby without the capacity
ever to develop a genuinely human spirituality. And it surely is not true that
in all such cases the child develops in some way which is more wonderful
than any of the ways the child would likely have developed if it had not
suffered from the disease or abuse; nor is it always (or even nearly always)
the case that humans around the abused child respond in loving ways and
grow spiritually to a degree unlikely without the tragedy. Sometimes such
things happen, but far from always.
Nor is it plausible to say that God allows the tragedy to happen to the child
because God knows that otherwise the child will grow up and do great evil.
If this were the reason for God to allow the tragedy, then why did God not
allow or cause some similar tragedy to happen to people who did in fact grow
up and do great evil-e.g., to people like Hitler? I believe that any proposed
justification for God's not intervening miraculously will similarly fall prey
to the objection that it opens God to the charge of unfairness, of treating
relevantly similar cases dissimilarly.
The appearance of unfairness is only strengthened if God sometimes intervenes miraculously in response to prayer, as some people believe. Again, the
problem is that God sometimes does so and sometimes does not do so in
situations which are apparently similar. That these are situations involving
a request by one whom God loves only compounds the problem, for it is not
loving to refuse the reasonable requests of someone whom one loves. But
what if the requests are not reasonable? Then God should not have granted
the requests in other similar situations. If the cases are similar, it is hard to
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see that one request is reasonable and another is not. Thus, belief that miracles occur in this way involves attributing an unfairness to God's activities,
which is inconsistent with the claim that God loves humans.
At this point the second line of response might be advanced: it might be
claimed that cases which appear similar to us might not be similar. Two
people might utter the same words in a prayer, but one mean them and the
other not. And two outcomes might not appear similar to us but might be
similar in their significance in the lives of those in whom they occur. I freely
grant that we may sometimes be in error in our judgments about similarities.
The question is whether it is likely that we are wrong about similarities as
often as it appears that similar prayers are responded to in very dissimilar
ways. Moreover, recovering and not recovering from an illness appear so
dissimilar that the lives and personalities of the people involved would have
to be very different for these outcomes to be no less similar. So I find it very
implausible to think that we are often wrong in our judgments about similarities on these matters.
Suppose, however, it is suggested not that we are usually wrong in our
judgments of similarities which we can discern, but that there is some other
underlying consistency which we do not discern but which some day (say, in
heaven) we will understand. We have no evidence that there is such an
underlying consistency, though I know of no way to give a conclusive proof
that there is not. But there is a moral argument against this suggestion too.
For it would seriously handicap believers if God were to leave them ignorant
of the principles of God's actions in matters which so deeply affect both them
and others in the world in which they are to embody God's will. If there is
some kind of a situation in which God will do something miraculous, then
for believers not to know this makes it impossible for them to act appropriately in this situation. Thus God should inform them, and clearly God has
not done so. (The postulated underlying consistency is ex hypothesi one of
whose basis we are ignorant.) But perhaps God does not inform us of the
reason because it is too complex for us to understand. We shall consider this
possibility in the final section of the paper.

Miracles and Religious Ambiguity
There is one other line of defense which might be offered by those who claim
that God has performed some miracles, either epistemic or practical. A person might argue that only in what John Hick has termed a "religiously ambiguous" context can people choose freely whether or not to serve God. In
such a context suffering must be more or less randomly distributed; in a world
in which certain human qualities were regularly connected with miraculous
divine interventions, many people would be motivated to turn to God by
desire for those benefits rather than by genuine love for God. 26 Because
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people's freely turning to God out of love is an overriding value, providing
the context needed to make this possible is also of great value. Since the
existence of a regular connection between certain creaturely qualities and
miraculous divine actions would be inconsistent with that value, God should
not provide it. Therefore, either miracles must occur in what seems to be a
random fashion, or they should not occur at all. And perhaps there are good
reasons for God to perform some miracles.
I will grant, for the sake of argument, the claim about the sort of context
required for a free human response to God. But why should God perform
any miracles at all? Many people do come to faith apart from miracles, and
many people (at least seem to) go through life without any direct benefit from
practical miracles. Why should God perform miracles for anyone? We have
looked at the reasons which have been proposed and found them inadequate.
To suggest that God might have good reasons which we do not know is an
appeal to our possible ignorance; it can never be decisively refuted, but
several p"Oints in this paper make it implausible. First, if the context of
religious ambiguity is to be maintained, any miracles God performs cannot
be obvious ones. If a defender of miracles has appealed to religious ambiguity
as necessary to achieving a good of overriding value, he would be guilty of
a serious inconsistency if he affirmed that God performed obvious miracles
for anyone.27 Yet some who make this appeal do believe that narratives in
the Bible accurately describe obvious miracles performed by God. For example, if accepted in all their details, the narratives of Elijah's dramatic
confrontation with the high priests of Baal and of the resurrection appearances of Jesus would be obvious miracles which destroy religious ambiguity.
Defenders of the importance of a religiously ambiguous context should be
concerned about such accounts, particularly the latter. 28 Stress on the importance of religious ambiguity does not imply that there cannot be any events
which manifest God, but it does imply that their manifesting God cannot be
the consequence of an obvious divine involvement; it must be discernible
only to the eye of faith.
What about inferred miracles? These are not obvious miracles, so they
would not necessarily destroy the religious ambiguity of the context. But
why should God miraculously intervene? If two people are in qualitatively
similar situations, there would be no relevant difference in their situations on
the basis of which God might decide to miraculously benefit one rather than
the other. If we say that there might be differences unknown to us on which
God bases the decision, we must ask whether or not these differences involve
matters generally thought to be of concern to God (e.g., the moral qualities
of the persons, or their potentialities for contributing positively to their communities). If they do, then it seems empirically unlikely that God bases
decisions about miraculous help on such qualities; as we have noted earlier,
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people who are qualitatively similar in ways we think important to God do
not regularly have similar unlikely things happen to them. Indeed, if similar
unlikely things happened to them, our situation would not be religiously
ambiguous. On the other hand, if the differences do not involve matters
generally thought to be of concern to God, then either God is helping people
because they have qualities which God does not particularly value (which is
a rather strange activity to be attributed to God) or God values qualities in
humans which God has not told us about. This last possibility is also somewhat strange. It suggests that in addition to the qualities God has told us to
develop, there are other valued qualities God has not told us about. But why
should God keep us in ignorance if these qualities are important to God?
Perhaps it might be objected that my line of argument in the previous
paragraph assumes that people's possessing certain qualities is a sufficient
condition for God to help them. Instead, it might be claimed that people's
possessing certain qualities provides a reason for God to help some people,
but God does not help all with such qualities (perhaps to help preserve
religious ambiguity). But then the decision about whom to help among those
who possess that quality is arbitrary. For either there are sufficient reasonsg
or the decision about whom to help among the group in question is arbitrary.2
Perhaps it will be replied that God arbitrarily chooses some people to help
in order to provide a revelatory foretaste of the future overcoming of the evils
which afflict people. But this suggestion attributes to God the motive not of
helping the particular people aided but of using the help to reveal God.
However, we have already seen that on the assumption of the importance of
religious ambiguity, this revelation cannot involve obvious miracles but instead must be discernible only to the eye of faith. But the eye of faith can
discern God even in non-miraculous creaturely events. So God's helping
people by non-obvious miracles seems unnecessary; it involves arbitrarily
choosing people to receive a miraculous benefit which is not necessary for
any known purpose of God. And this does seem to meet my criteria for
unfairness without proposing any compensating value.
Perhaps the problem with understanding the basis on which God decides
whom to help is not that the properties themselves are too complex for us to
grasp, but rather that the connection between the miraculous event and the
occurrence of the later event with the desired properties is too complex for
us to see. For example, perhaps God miraculously helped someone fifty years
ago so that there would occur some recognizable good today; we today mat;
see the good, but we do not see the connection between the two events?
Since this proposal appeals to unknown connections, I know of no decisive
counterargument, but I can explain why I find it implausible. Christians
generally believe that (one of) God's most important goal(s) for humans is
that they respond in faith to God, and it seems implausible to think that any
particular miracle or indeed all miracles together are necessary to make such
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a response possible. They certainly are not needed as an evidential basis for
faith, for people come to faith without this basis. 3 ! Nor does it seem plausible
to think that they are needed to maintain a physical and/or social environment
in which people can come to faith; surely ordinary laws of nature and people
operating within them are adequate to do that. And if it is said that they are
needed to bring about certain particular events (e.g., certain events in the
lives of particular individuals or a certain state of a society), one must wonder
why these events are deemed important enough to merit a miraculous intervention by God when other terrible events were allowed to happen (e.g., the
Holocaust, mass starvations, etc.). It seems implausible to think that events
of the sort which are said to be practical miracles (healing a particular individual or meeting some other need or desire of an individual) are the only or
best way to prevent greater evils (or promote greater goods) than the evils which
God has permitted (and it would be strange for God to permit greater evils and
prevent lesser ones). Of course, the implausibility is relative to what we know
or have reason to believe, and perhaps we are just too ignorant on such matters
to be able to reach a conclusion in which we can place any justified confidence.
So let us consider finally the defense based on our ignorance.
For the defender of miracles always has this as a fall-back position: God
chooses people to receive miraculous benefits for reasons known to God and
not to us humans, or God chooses people arbitrarily because doing so makes
possible the achieving of some divine goals unknown to us. As I said earlier,
I know of no way to disprove this suggestion conclusively. But I would ask
the defender of miracles to consider why she is so sure that miracles have in
fact occurred. If she cannot give a coherent account of miracles without
making claims about our ignorance central, perhaps that indicates not the
limitations on her understanding of God but rather the incorrectness of her
belief that God has performed miracles. In addition to all the much discussed
evidential problems involved in justifying the claim that God has performed
miracles, I have tried to show that there are serious moral problems involved
in trying to give an empirically plausible account of when and why God has
performed miracles. If we knew for certain that God had in fact performed
miracles, then we would have to assume that there is some solution to the
problems even if we are ignorant of it. But if the claim that God has performed miracles is itself regarded as defeasible, then the problems I have
raised may make it seem more justified simply to abandon the claim?2
Wofford College

NOTES
1. The nearest terms in the New Testament are "sign," "wonder," and "mighty deed"
(in Greek, semeia, teras, and dynamis, respectively). Each of these terms refers to an
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event, often unexpected and/or wonderful, in which God is (believed to be) manifested
without implying that the event involves a suspension of laws of nature as we understand
them today. However, some of the events to which they refer, if certain details happened
as they are described, do seem to have aspects which involve such suspensions. (The
information about New Testament concepts is taken from Bernard W. Anderson, "Signs
and Wonders," Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, ed. George Buttrick, et al. [New York:
Abingdon Press, 1962], Vol. IV, pp. 348-51.)
2. Since in the New Testament there is no exact equivalent to miracle in our sense of
the term, some might contend that I should not build into the concept of a miracle the
requirement that it involve a temporary suspension of some law of nature. But it was not
I who built it in; that was done by numerous philosophers and theologians in our Western
tradition. And this requirement is central to the problem I am discussing in this paper: a
miracle in this sense implies a type of divine activity qualitatively different from the sort
of divine activity present in most events; I will argue that such activity would constitute
a kind of unfairness by God. My criticism would not apply if miracle is understood to
be simply an event which some person takes as manifesting God but in which God does
not suspend any laws of nature.
3. Because this moral argument does hinge on the assumption that we should not
attribute morally problematic qualities to God, it will have no force against those who
believe that God transcends morality or that God follows moral principles which transcend
our grasp. I will not try to defend my assumption in this paper, for to do so would take
me too far afield. I shall, however, note that I think that most of those who believe that
God performs miracles would agree with my assumption.
4. I admit that the problem I am raising about miracles is just one aspect of the problem
of evil for theological determinists and anyone else who would claim that God intends
everything that happens to every person. For them, miracles raise no special problem.
However, many theists today would not claim this; I shall argue that for those theists
miracles pose a distinct problem of evil.
5. It is clear that the charge of implying that God is unfair in this sense cannot justly
be leveled at theodicies of the sort mentioned above. For they imply that a person's
suffering or not suffering evil is the result of the operation of creaturely forces and is not
specifically intended by God. At certain points in the paper I will indicate in more detail
the way the unfairness which I am discussing differs from certain other sorts of apparent
evil which may seem similar.
6. Of course, the attribution of any of these properties is relative to the beliefs of the
attributer. If an event did involve a suspension of some law of nature but an observer
were ignorant of the law and of the sorts of processes which occur in accordance with it,
she would not recognize that the event involved a suspension of a law of nature and might
not find the event unexpected. Likewise, if the observer did not see the purpose of the
event as good, she would not attribute it to God. This is presumably why the Pharisees
in the New Testament are represented as saying of certain wondrous deeds of Jesus that
they were done by the power of Beelzebub.
7. In drawing the distinction this way, I do not wish to imply that there are not any
inferences involved in the thoughts which lead one to the conclusion that an obvious
miracle occurred. In particular, there may be inferences involved in arriving at the
reconstruction of the process which constitutes the event and in arriving at the laws of
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nature which one accepts. But once these two intellectual tasks have been completed,
then if there is a logical inconsistency between the statements describing the event and
those describing some accepted law of nature and if the event is categorized as a miracle
(rather than, e.g., an occasion to rethink some law of nature), then the event is an obvious
miracle; if not and the event is categorized as a miracle, then it is an inferred miracle.
8. Of course, no such inference need be made if one means by miracle simply an
unexpected event which a person interprets as manifesting God, but which need not
involve any suspension of a law of nature. But not even an atheist need deny that miracles
in this sense occur.
9. I am using this purely as a simple illustration to explicate "taking the initiative;" I
do not mean to suggest that I think God does or should folio w such a policy. If God were
to adopt a policy of responding with a miracle to anyone who met a certain condition, the
condition would presumably involve the religious commitment of the person and probably
the content of the request etc.
10. A third possible rejoinder is that moral terms are not applied to God and humans in
a sufficiently univocal sense to make possible judgments such as that God is unfair. I
cannot pursue this complex issue, but I will reply that the burden of proof seems to me to
fall heavily on the one who makes this rejoinder. For 1 take it that Christians have applied
moral terms to God and have thought it important to believe that God is good (and just
etc.) in a sense similar to that in which humans are. Even in primary religious material
such as the Bible, writers wonder how God can be just, and the observations which evoke
this question are similar to those which would raise this question about humans-4:.g.,
how it can be just for God to permit the good to suffer and the wicked to prosper. This
issue is raised in many psalms, and why a good man suffers is the question which underlies
the Book of Job.
II. The concern expressed abstractly in this paragraph was voiced with far more feeling
by Lewis B. Smedes, a professor at Ful\cr Seminary:
My problem was a nagging anxiety 1 felt about touting miraculous healings
of assorted bearable ailments as signals of God's power and God's desire to
heal our suffering in a world of chock-ful\ of suffering that never comes close
to getting healed. It was a feeling 1 could not shake ... a stubborn, uneasy
feeling about the fittingness, even the decency, of celebrating far and wide
the miraculous healing of a relatively few ailments within a world endemically infected by enormous, intractable, unalleviated suffering. It felt to me
like proclaiming that God is alive and well in the world because you survived
an airplane crash in which everyone else perished. (The Reformed Journal,
February 1989, p.14 [the entire article occupies pp. 14-21].)
Although Smedes' concern seems to focus on the alleged inappropriateness of touting and
celebrating healings, and mine on the al\eged unfairness of God's healing some and not
others, it seems to me that the concerns are similar. (1 am indebted to George Mavrodes
for bringing this article to my attention.)
12. I will not continue to mention this alternative explicitly, but I intend it to apply in
the following discussion.
13. Various important Christian authors have claimed that God causes miracles for this
purpose. For example, Thomas Aquinas says that God does miracles "for the profit of
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mankind" in two ways: "one for the confirmation of the truth preached, another to
demonstrate the holiness of someone whom God wishes to propose to men as an example
of virtuous living" (Summa Theologiae [New York: McGraw-Hili Book Company], 2a2ae,
q. 187, art. 2). John Calvin holds that miracles are done in order to confirm the divine
authority of certain people and the divinity of Christ (Institutes of the Christian Religion,
ed. John T. McNeill, tr. Ford Lewis Battles [Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1960] T, viii,
5.). He also says that they are sometimes done to strengthen the faith of some people
(ibid., IV, xiv, 18). According to Richard Swinburne, one very important reason for
accepting an alleged prophet as genuine and the prophet's message as a revelation from
God is that the giving of the message is accompanied by miracles and that the prophet
accurately predicts events whose occurrence requires a miracle (Faith and Reason [New
York: Oxford University Press, 1983], pp. 185, 189f.). Though Swinburne does not think
that these are the only reasons for accepting the prophet and the message, he does think
them very important in the overall case for such acceptance. (The other reasons are given
on 183f.) But only the ways which involve miracles could give one reason to think that
the prophet has knowledge of matters beyond ordinary human ken. The import Swinburne
gives to miracles is well conveyed by the following quotation: "For another revelation to
be more probable than the Christian revelation, it would have to be backed by a more
evident miracle, or be backed by a miracle no less evident but containing more evidently
true and deep teaching, or perhaps, be backed by a miracle somewhat less evident but
containing teaching far more evidently true and deep" (pp. I 92f.). Thus, Swinburne does
suggest that a central purpose for miracles is to rationally certify the occurrence of
revelation.
14. It might be suggested that perhaps we could know the immediate purpose of God's
doing something (e.g., to help someone) but not know God's further purpose (e.g., why
God helped this person rather than someone else). I shall deal with this suggestion at
greater length near the end of the paper. Here I will simply note that the only immediate
purposes in terms of which some event has been seen as a miracle are what I termed
epistemic or practical.
IS. The account of miracles given by Thomas Aquinas suggests that they might occur
at times other than during these revelatory periods, for he says they occur "for the
confirmation of the truth preached ... [and] to demonstrate the holiness of someone whom
God wishes to propose to men as an example of virtuous living" (Summa Theologiae,
2a2ae, q. 187. art. 2). Calvin implies that miracles done to confirm the divine authority
of people and the divinity of Christ have ceased; he writes:
It was fitting that the new preaching of the gospel and the new Kingdom of
Christ should be illumined and magnified by unheard-of and extraordinary
miracles. When the Lord ceased from these, he did not utterly forsake his
church, but declared that the magnificence of his Kingdom and the dignity
of his word had been excellently enough disclosed. (Institutes, IV, xix, 6.)
I could find no explicit comment on whether miracles done to strengthen the faith of some
people also have ceased, though Calvin's great stress on the sufficiency of the miracles to
confirm the revelation that culminated in Christ might suggest that he would think that no
miracles were needed thereafter for this second purpose. I think that Swinburne's view
suggests that miracles will occur with greatest frequency in revelatory times, though I do
not think it implies that they will occur only then.
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16. I am overlooking events observed by scientists which occasion questions about
whether the accepted laws of nature are adequate, but which no one is tempted to term
miracles-e.g., the observation of traces on photographic plates which led to the discovery
of radioactivity.
17. If the event were designed so as to be thought a miracle (or candidate event) by
only a small subset of the observers, then the question of fairness would arise in relation
to those for whom it is not designed to be seen as a miracle (or candidate event).
18. It certainly is logically possible that obvious miracles (or at least candidate events)
occur today if they occurred in the past. They could even be highly public. They could
occur annually: e.g., each New Year's Day one well-known saintly person who had died
during the previous year and whose death was very well documented could return to life.
Or God could cause the same audible message to be heard by every person in the world
in his or her own native language at the same time and with no detectible source for the
message. Such public miracles do not occur today. Nor do most people experience more
private events which are obvious miracles or candidate events.
19. Alternatively, they could observe miraculous events which made no reference to the
earlier events but which conveyed to them a content or message equivalent to that of the
earlier events. This would not confirm the revelatory status of the earlier events, but it
would be a way of treating them no worse than the eyewitnesses of the earlier events.
20. The documentation would have to be extremely strong because the events are
contrary to laws of nature. Even those who believe that miracles occur usually agree that
stronger documentary evidence is needed to justify belief in their occurrence than would
be needed for non-miraculous events.
21. Some evidence to support this can be gained from the texts quoted in note 13.
22. Examples include Jesus' changing the water into wine (John 2: 1-11) and the raising
of Lazarus (10hn 11:17-44).
23. I know of no one who has proposed this theory, but it seems to me to be a possible
line of response which I want to evaluate. Moreover, a defense for this theory might be
constructed by reflecting on the fact that some people label as miracles events of the sort
I termed inferred miracles. It seems that in deciding whar events to label with this term,
the psychological impact of the event on the observer and the observer's feelings about
the event play an important role.
24. Some thinkers might say that no rational grounds are available: the most that can
be done is to give psychological motivation. 1 would reply that even if that is so, it is
unfair to provide miracles as a motivation for some and not for others. Suppose it is
claimed that not only are there no rational grounds for accepting the revelation, but the
revelation is absurd and faith is the gift of God. If all this is claimed, then it would seem
that serious consideration would not be a useful way to bring one to accept the revelation
and that miracles have no epistemic function. Some Christians might hold this position,
but it falls outside the view under discussion in this paper. I will, however, pose this
question for those who hold this view: if you believe that God works miracles, with what
purpose (do you believe) God does this? If an epistemic purpose is rejected, I think it
will be difficult to identify any plausible purpose other than what 1 have termed practical,
and we shall see that this latter purpose also has problems. We have also seen that the
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claim that we humans cannot know the purpose of miracles or that they have no purpose
raises grave problems for those who want to affirm that miracles have occurred.
25. It is important to note that I am discussing a view which claims that God does
sometimes intervene to perform practical miracles. The comments which follow in the
text would not apply to a view which said that God absolutely never intervenes miraculously, for then there would be no unfairness to anyone. But there would also be no true
claims that God works miracles.
26. John Hick (Evil and the God of Love [New York: Harper & Row, 1966)) is one of
many who have made this claim.
27. The only possible exception I can think of is a person so thoroughly committed to
God that maintaining religious ambiguity for her would no longer be important. But few
people today or at any time meet that criterion, nor do all the events in the Bible which
seem to be obvious miracles meet it, as I illustrate in the text.
28. It is hard to see how a defender of the importance of religious ambiguity could admit
that there could be exceptions. If genuine faith can sometimes be born in non-ambiguous
contexts, why could it not generally be born in such contexts?
29. It is true that humans decide to help some and not to help others who are equally
needy, yet we do not usually call such decisions arbitrary. But humans must make a choice
because their resources are limited; if they had the resources, they presumably would help
everyone. God does not face this limitation. God's reason for limiting those whom God
helps is supposedly the maintenance of a religiously ambiguous context. If that is so
important, then why should God help anyone?
30. For this proposal to be viable God must have a detailed knowledge of all possible
future events and of which ones will become actual if God does certain things. And for
this to be possible, either compatibiJism must be true or God must have something like
middle knowledge. I have doubts about both, but I cannot pursue them here.
31. And if they are said to be necessary for some people to come to faith, then if God
performs a miracle for them in order to bring them to faith, God is being unfair unless
God performs a miracle for everyone whom a miracle would bring to faith. The claim
that God performs a miracle for every such person implies that all persons who do not
become people of faith would not become people of faith even if God performed a miracle
for them. And this seems to me highly implausible, despite the statement attributed to
Abraham in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Lk 16:31).
32. I wish to thank two anonymous referees of this journal for their comments on an
earlier version of this paper and George Mavrodes for his comments on a still earlier
version, which was read at the 1990 meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Religion.

